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TERESA M. CONTARDO
(617) 482-3600

SMITH BARNEY

.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DJSTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

I
TERESA M. CONTARDO

Plaintiff

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 86-1081-S

V.

MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE,
FENNER & SMITH.INC
Defendant

FINDINGS OF FACT, RULINGS OF LAW
AND ORDER FOR JUDGMENT

December 14, 1990

SKINNER, D.J.
In this action the plaintiff seeks damages under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f), and the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, M.G.L. c. 151B,
for alleged disparate treatment while in the employment of the defendant, based upon
her sex. 1 The action was tried without jury.
The plaintiff alleges that she was constructively discharged from her position as
a broker because of sex discrimination which created intolerable conditions of
employment, leading her to resign her position in August, 1984. She has offered direct
evidence of the existence of a male oriented atmosphere, but with respect to the events

1

In the plaintiff's brief, the writer says, "Like the Dickens novel this is a story of
two offices --," presumably a reference to A Tale of Two Cities. I suggest that a better
Dickensian reference, at least as to title, would be Great Expectations, or from the
plaintiff's point of view, Bleak House.

which precipitated her resignation, she relies on circumstantial evidence.
At the outset, the plaintiff must make out a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination.

Her prima facie case may be established by inference in a

discriminatory treatment case as well as in a discriminatory impact case. Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988). Denial of opportunities for promotion and

advancement by reason of sex discrimination may constitute intolerable conditions of
employment justifying an employee's resignation, and warranting a finding of
constructive discharge. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F. 2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
("Hopkins/") rev'd on other grounds, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109

S. Ct. 1775 (1989); after remand "Hopkins II," 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 20852 (D.C. Cir.
December 4,

"The burden of proving a prima facie case is 'not

1990).

onerous' ... [citation]. 11

Watson, supra, 487 U.S. at 986.

With respect to this case, it

would appear that the plaintiff's prima facie case is established by evidence that she
is a member of a protected class, that she was qualified to participate in the
employment opportunities offered by her employer, that the same opportunities were
offered to others, not in the protected class, who were no more qualified than she, and
that her deprivation was the result of intentional discrimination or its functional
equivalent. Watson, supra, 487 U.S. at 987. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

The Court has held that not only may disparate impact

analysis be utilized in disparate treatment cases, but that "subjective or discretionary
employment practices may be analyzed under the disparate impact approach in
appropriate cases." Watson, supra, 487 U.S. at 991.
2

The plaintiff must identify the

particular employment practice which she alleges has discriminatory effect, and establish
a causal connection to the alleged disparate treatment. Id., at 994.
If the plaintiff's prima facie case be established by disparate treatment analysis,
that is, by inference from the observed consequences of the offending employment
practice, then the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate,
non-discriminatory business reason for its conduct. The plaintiff, however, retains the
ultimate burden of proof, which may be satisfied by evidence that the defendant's
asserted reason is probably a mere pretext.

If the plaintiff's prima facie case be

supported by direct evidence of sex discrimination, however, the defendant has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence, as an affirmative defense, that
the same employment decision would have been made for a neutral reason in the
absence of the discriminatory motive. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775
(1989). It is, of course, always open to the defendant to contest the reliability of the
evidence supporting the plaintiff's prima facie case.
Sex discrimination has cast a shadow on the plaintiff's relationship with the
defendant from the very outset. When she applied for a position as a broker in 1972,
the defendant employed no women above the secretarial and staff assistant level. The
plaintiff's application for a position as a broker (or "account executive" in the defendant's
parlance) was rejected. Only after she successfully prosecuted a sex discrimination
complaint before the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination was she
employed by the defendant as a stockbroker. Even the employment examination was
clearly designed to be answered by men.

During the early part of her service with the
3

defendant, she was subjected to varying forms of sexual harassment, including the
placing of male pornographic pictures in her desk, and repeated sexual innuendoes
and improper touching at office gatherings, such as Christmas parties. There existed
in the office a male "locker room" atmosphere in which the male brokers engaged in
lewd remarks and male birthdays were celebrated in the office, in the presence of
customers, with, for instance, a birthday cake in the shape of a phallus, and on other
occasions by the presence of "exotic" female dancers. She never complained to the
management about this conduct.
The plaintiff was also excluded from various company outings to which male
brokers were invited and at which important information was exchanged. She was not
informed that the defendant had tickets to various sporting events which it made
available to its male brokers to offer to favored customers.
Despite these conditions the plaintiff persevered. She worked very hard and
became one of the top producers in the defendant's Boston office. The defendant
ranked the performance of its brokers nation-wide by assigning them to various "clubs."
The plaintiff was assigned to the Win Smith Club, the second highest category in the
defendant' national organization. Her efforts were recognized to a considerable degree.
She was given favorable office space, an honor reserved for major producers. She
received a very complimentary review from the office manager when she was
considering taking a management position. She was offered the management position,
but declined it, becai.ise she would have to relinquish her "book," her list of regular
customers, and forego the opportunity to develop a larger income through
4

commissions.

She was given two positions of responsibility, coordinator of the

defendant's insurance program and coordinator of the defendant's Cash Management
Account program. Both insurance and cash management accounts were important new
products for the defendant, particularly the cash mam:.gor, ieiit ..,. o~ran i, wi iich '"'J;Tn;:ied
the defendant to process virtually all of a customer's financial affairs for a fee.
defendant claims to have invented this product.

The

In each case, the plaintiff was

responsible for educating the other brokers about the programs and encouraging the
promotion of these programs in the Boston office. She received no compensation for
these extra efforts, a circumstance which she identifies as one of the discriminatory acts
which rendered her employment intolerable.
There were three areas in which the plaintiff claims that she was denied an equal
opportunity to make money because of sex discrimination:
Participation in the private placement of tax-sheltered limited
1.
partnership shares in real estate;
2. Participation in the division of the "book11 of retiring or departing
brokers; and
3. Compensation for her efforts in coordinating two important sales
programs.
Tax-sheltered investments were in great demand prior to the Tax Reform Act of
1986. A broker who was able to direct a customer into such an investment garnered
favor with the customer as well as earning a substantial commission. The opportunities
for such placement were severely restricted, and the defendant's Boston office was
assigned only a limited number. Under the applicable governmental rules, investors in

5

these partnerships were required to qualify for the opportunity by showing that they
were experienced and informed investors with adequate financial resources to absorb
the risks involved. Brokers were given the opportunity to submit Offeree Qualification
Wires (OQW's) to the New York office on behalf of their customers. The customer's
qualification would be determined by the New York office. If there were more qualified
customers than there were investment opportunities,

the investments would be

allocated among the brokers in the Boston office by the local coordinator, a broker by
the name of Hanlon. Theoretically, all of the brokers were supposed to be notified of
the availability of these units and given a chance to submit as many OQW's as they
wished. The plaintiff claims that in fact the availability of these investments was not
widely advertised, but funneled by Hanlon to particularly favored brokers, all of whom
were men. Hanlon admitted in testimony that he encouraged certain brokers to submit
OQW's because he thought their customers were likely to qualify and were likely to
actually purchase these units. He testified that he did not consider the plaintiff to be
a broker who was likely to close sales of these units, because on one occasion she
had asked him to make the presentation for her.
There was evidence of twelve real estate placements processed through the
Boston office from 1980 through 1984. Twenty-nine brokers submitted a total of 185
OQW's, resulting in the sale of 68 units.

Four brokers, Hanlon, Reilly, Knouse and

Martineau, accounted for 106 OQW's and 50 sales. Hanlon and Reilly alone accounted
for 57 OQW's and 36 sales. The plaintiff submitted six OQW's, resulting in three sales.
The only other female broker to participate in this program was Mary Calhoun, who
6

submitted one OQW, which did not result in a sale.

The 23 other equally

disadvantaged brokers were men, a few of whom had production records that were as
good as the plaintiff's.
Distribution of the accounts of brokers who left or retired from the defendant's
Boston office was handled on a very informal basis. The departing broker's choice of
a person to handle particular accounts, the preference of the customer and
management's attempts to match the customer to a particular broker were the key
factors in the reassignment of accounts, according to the defendant.

Only six actual

records of account reassignment have been found. In each of these cases the best
producing accounts went to men.

In four of these cases the plaintiff received but a

few low paying accounts, which she describes with some justice as "crumbs from the
table." The two accounts in which she secured a better share were of two departing
female brokers, and even then the top producing accounts went to men.

The

defendant says that in the case of Paul Dussosoit, his accounts had to be reassigned
to another expert in commodities trading, which is a specialty. This may explain why
the best accounts all went to one broker, but does not explain why other substantial
accounts went to men who were not specialists, such as Baumann, while only two
small accounts went to the plaintiff, and none to any other woman.

Only two other

women received any reassignments: Amy Botto received six very small accounts from
Baumann and Mary Calhoun received three small accounts from Bain.
The defendant says that (1) this is an insubstantial sample upon which to base
a statistical conclusion, (2) there was no deliberate discrimination and (3) things just
7

happened that way. The defendant also points out, correctly, that some of the men did
not do well in receiving reassignments.

It is also true that

men of the plaintiff's

experience and production record in general did better than she did, and neither the
plaintiff nor any other woman received any substantial accounts as a result of the
reassignment process revealed by the six extant accounts. While there were doubtless
many other departures in this highly mobile industry, for which there are no extant
records, the plaintiff testified that she never received substantial accounts as part of the
reassignment process, and there is no reason to disbelieve her.
There were no criteria or standards promulgated by the defendant to determine
when project coordinators received additional compensation.
apparently totally discretionary, not to say whimsical.

The award was

Several men received extra

production credits, which translated into extra income; several men did not. Hanlon
received $258,000 of extra production credits for his work as tax shelter coordinator,
thus increasing his standing as well as substantially increasing his income.

The

defendant says that this award resulted from Hanlon's work for the whole New England
region, but there is evidence that his duties were no more onerous than were the
In any case, no woman serving as a

plaintiff's with respect to her programs.

coordinator was ever awarded extra credits, or extra benefits in any form, for her
efforts.
In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, supra, 487 U.S. at 990-1, there appears
the following statement, in which all of the Justices concurred:
If an employer's undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking has
8

precisely the same effect as a system pervaded by impermissible
intentional discrimination, it is difficult to see why Title Vll's proscription
against discriminatory actions should not apply. In both circumstances,
the employer's practices may be said to 11adversely affect [an individual's]
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(2). We conclude,
accordingly, that subjective or discretionary employment practices may be
analyzed under the disparate impact approach in appropriate cases.
This is just such an appropriate case.

While the evidence adduced by the

plaintiff admittedly does not furnish a quantum of data to support a true statistical
analysis, there is, in my opinion, sufficient circumstantial evidence to warrant a finding
that the plaintiff was the victim of sex discrimination in the course of her employment
by the defendant.
One would expect that in a course of sex-neutral decision making, the plaintiff
would have been accorded favorable treatment in at least one of the areas outlined
above, given her seniority, proven capacity and devotion to the work of the office.

The

fact that the defendant's "undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking 11 led always
to favor the men over the women, against a background of overt insensitivity and actual
harassment in the past, "suggest[s) a lingering form of the problem that Title VII was
enacted to combat." Watson, supra, 487 U.S. at 990. Accordingly, I find and rule that
the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of sex discrimination in employment.
The burden thus shifts to the defendant to

11

articulate some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason" for the disparate treatment of the plaintiff.

McDonnell

Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Watson, supra, at 986. The

defendant's proffered evidence has been described above, and does not even purport

9

to deny the overtly male-dominated mores of the office, and as to the three areas of
which the plaintiff complains, it offers only discretionary judgments uninformed by any
established criteria or policy.

"Obviously, in cases ... in which the legitimate reason

articulated by the employer was of such a subjPctive nature .:1s to it~9lf invite
stereotyping, the employer bears the additional burden of showing that the stereotyped
attitudes did not so pervade the subjective evaluation as to destroy the articulated
reason's legitimacy." Hopkins II, supra, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS at 7.

I have serious

doubt that the defendant's evidence even satisfies its burden of production. In any
case, I find and rule that the plaintiff has satisfied her burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's asserted justification for disparate
treatment, i.e., the exercise of sound discretion, is a pretext for sex discrimination in the
form of pervasive indifference to and denial of the right of female employees to enjoy
equal opportunities with their male counterparts. Accordingly, I find as a fact that the
plaintiff had been subjected to sex discrimination in employment by the defendant up
to the time that she resigned her position.
That is not to say, however, that she suffered a constructive discharge. "(T]he
mere fact of discrimination, without more, is insufficient to make out a claim of
constructive discharge." Hopkins I, supra, 825 F.2d at 473. The "more 11 in Hopkins I
was an employment decision which "would have been viewed as a career-ending
action. 11 Id.. Other cast:s in which constructive discharge has been found evidenced
demotion, humiliating and unjustified criticism or additional work loads. E.g., Calhoun
v. Acme Cleveland Corp., 798 F. 2d 559 (1st Cir 1986). l do not find any of these
10

additional factors to be present in this case. The defendant obviously did not want the
plaintiff to leave, and at least by 1984 she was not being harassed or otherwise
abused. The defendant's failure to afford her an equal shot at some lucrative business,
while in my view a violation of Title VII and M.G.L c. 151 B, was not career-ending. She
was, in fact, enjoying a rather successful career, with the likelihood, by her own
account, that it would become more successful in time.
The discrimination which I find to have occurred was relatively covert,

and

habitual, even mindless, rather than pre-meditated, though no less detrimental from the
plaintiff's point of view, or illegal from this court's point of view, than overt discrimination
might have been.

In my opinion the facts adduced in this case do not warrant a

finding of constructive discharge. Cf., Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114
(1st Cir. 1977).

Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the present state of the record does not warrant
the granting of any of the relief which she seeks under Title VII. She does not seek
reinstatement, and she has introduced no evidence of the differential between what she
actually earned as an employee of the defendant and what she would have earned in
the absence of discrimination, which might be construed as back pay.

The only

damage evidence relates to wrongful discharge. Compensatory and punitive damages
may not be recovered under Title VII, which provides for equitable remedies only.
Accordingly, I find for the defendant on the plaintiff's claims under Title VII.
A different set of rules governs the plaintiff's claim under M.G.L. c. 1518,
however.

Section 9 of that chapter provides for compensatory damages, including
11

.
"front pay:' Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 402 Mass. 385, 523 N.E. 2d 255 (1988).

By St. 1989, c. 722.
damages.

§ 31, section 9 was amended by adding a provision for punitive

The traditional method of interpreting statutory amendments is to apply

substantive changes prospectively only, but to apply remedial and procedural changes
retroactively. See Ellis v. Ford Motor Company, 628 F. Supp. 849, 852 (D. Mass. 1986),
citing In re Beausolei/'s Case, 321 Mass. 344, 73 N.E.2d 461 (1947). I conclude that
the provision for punitive damages applies to this case.
The statute provides no criteria for the application of punitive damages other
than the admonition that "this chapter shall be construed

liberally for the

accomplishment of the purposes thereof." M.G.L c. 151 B, § 9. This is in contrast to
the rare other provisions for punitive damages in Massachusetts law, which generally
provide that punitive damages are to apply only to a defendant's willful, malicious or
wanton and reckless conduct. E.g., M.G.L., c. 229, §2; c. 93A. § 11. I conclude, in the
absence of any indication to the contrary, that punitive damages may be employed to
accomplish the purposes of the statute. "The general rule that punitive damages may
not be awarded unless the party seeking them has sustained actual damage is
accepted universally ... " by the states. Tinney, Sufficiency of Showing of Actual
Damages to Support Award of Punitive Damages -- Modern Cases, 40 ALR 4th 11, 18.

A majority of state courts which have considered the question, however, have held that
nominal damages fulfill the requirement of actual damages. Id. at 36-40.

The

Massachusetts courts have not addressed the issue, either under this statute or in any

12

other context.

2

For the reasons stated above I can not find actual damages on this record.
The plaintiff has asserted a claim for mental and emotional distress.

In my opinion

such damages are probably recoverable under M.G.L. c. 151 B, § 9, if proved.

The

testimony of plaintiff's expert was equivocal on the issue of the cause of her condition,
however, and I do not find the causal connection to have been established by a
preponderance of the evidence.
I do find that the plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages in the amount of $1.00

and punitive damages in the amount of $250,000. In my opinion, the purposes of the
statute will be served by the deterrent effect of this award, by deterring what I believe
to be endemic and habitual discrimination against women by undisciplined discretionary
decisions in workplaces dominated by men. The plaintiff is also entitled to her

2

By analogy, a number of federal courts have awarded punitive damages even

in the absence of actual damages in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Endicott
v. Huddleston, 644 F.2d 1208, 1217 (7th Cir. 1980). See also Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d
74, 88 (3rd Cir. 1965); Harrison v. United Transportation Union, 530 F.2d 558, 563 (4th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976); McCulloch v. Glasgow, 620 F.2d 47, 51
(5th Cir. 1980); Silver v. Cormier, 529 F.2d 161, 163 (10th Cir. 1976); Spence v. Staras,
507 F.2d 554, 558 (7th Cir. 1974); Gill v. Manuel, 488 F.2d 799, 802 (9th Cir. 1973);
Stolberg v. Members of Board of Trustees for the State Colleges of Connecticut, 474
F.2d 485, 490 (2nd Cir. 1973).
13

reasonable attorney's fees under c. 151 B. §9, and to interest calculated in accordance
with the Massachusetts rule.
A judgment in accordance with the foregoing shall enter forthwith.

14

